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Abstract
We present a fibre-optical quantum key distribution system. It works at 1550nm and is based on
the plug&play setup. We tested the stability under field conditions using aerial and terrestrial cables
and performed a key exchange over 67 km between Geneva and Lausanne.
I Introduction
Quantum cryptography or, more exactly, quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most advanced subject
in the field of quantum information technologies. Since the introduction of the BB84 protocol by Bennett
and Brassard in 1984 [1] and their first implementation in 1992[2], many experiments have been performed
by numerous groups (see e.g. [3] for a review). However, to our knowledge, all experiments to date were
performed in laboratories or used laboratory equipment (e.g. liquid nitrogen cooled the detectors) or
needed frequent alignments (e.g. control of polarisation or phase). In this paper, we present a turn-key,
fibre-optic QKD-prototype that fits into two 19” boxes, one for Alice and one for Bob (see Fig.1). We
tested the stability of the auto-compensating plug&play system [4] over installed terrestrial and aerial
cables. Keys were exchanged over a distance of 67 km.
We start with a short introduction to the plug&play auto-compensating setup, before describing the
features of the prototype. We then recall the relevant parameters of a QKD system and shortly discuss
some security issues. Finally the results of the field tests are presented.
II Plug&Play Prototype
Let’s recall the principle of the so called plug&play auto-compensating setup [4, 5, 6, 7, 8], where the key
is encoded in the phase between two pulses travelling from Bob to Alice and back (see Fig. 2). A strong
laser pulse (@1550 nm) emitted at Bob is separated at a first 50/50 beamsplitter (BS). The two pulses
impinge on the input ports of a polarisation beamsplitter (PBS), after having travelled through a short
arm and a long arm, including a phase modulator (PMB) and a 50 ns delay line (DL), respectively. All
fibres and optical elements at Bob are polarisation maintaining. The linear polarisation is turned by 90
degrees in the short arm, therefore the two pulses exit Bob’s setup by the same port of the PBS. The
pulses travel down to Alice, are reflected on a Faraday-mirror, attenuated and come back orthogonally
polarized. In turn, both pulses now take the other path at Bob and arrive at the same time at the BS
where they interfere. Then, they are detected either in D1, or after passing through the circulator (C)
in D2. Since the two pulses take the same path, inside Bob in reversed order, this interferometer is
auto-compensated. To implement the BB84 protocol, Alice applies a phase shift of 0 or pi and pi
2
or 3pi
2
on the second pulse with PMA. Bob chooses the measurement basis by applying a 0 or
pi
2
shift on the
first pulse on its way back.
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The prototype is easy to use. The two boxes just have to be connected via an optical fibre. They
are exclusively driven by two computers via the USB port. The two computers communicate via a
ethernet/internet link. The system monitors on-line the temperature of the detectors, radiators and
cases. The photon counters are Peltier-cooled, actively gated, InGaAs/InP APD’s [9]. The darkcount
noise of the detectors is measured during the initialization (the darkcount probability pdark is ≈10
−5 per
gate). Although the setup needs no optical alignment, the phases and the detection gates must be applied
at the right time. Therefore, the system measures in a next step the length of the link (the operator
has only to estimate the line’s length at more or less 5 km). The variable attenuator (VA) at Alice is
set to a low level and bright laser pulses are emitted by Bob. The time delay between the triggering
of the laser and a train of gates of the detectors is scanned until the reflected pulses are detected. The
delays for the two 2.5 ns detection gates are adjusted, as well as the timing for the 50 ns pulse applied
on the phasemodulator PMB . In the plug&play scheme, where pulses travel back and forth, (Rayleigh)
backscattered light can considerably increase the noise. Therefore, the laser is not continuously pulsed,
but trains of pulses are sent, the length of these trains corresponding to the length of the storage-line
introduced for this purpose behind the attenuator at Alice’s[5]. Consequently, the backward propagating
pulses do no longer cross bright pulses in the fibre. For a storage line measuring approximately 10 km,
a pulse train contains 480 pulses at a frequency of 5 MHz. A 90% coupler (BS10/90) directs most of the
incoming light pulses to a APD-detector module (DA). It generates the trigger signal used to synchronise
Alice’s 20 Mhz clock with the one of Bob. This synchronized clock allows Alice to apply a 50 ns pulse
at the phasemodulator PMA exactly when the second, weaker pulse passes. Only this second pulse
contains phase information and must be attenuated below the one-photon-per-pulse level. Measuring the
height of the incoming pulses with DA would allow to adjust the attenuator in order to obtain the right
average number of photons per outgoing pulse. For this purpose, the attenuator and the detector must
be calibrated beforehand. In practice, we measure the incoming power with a power-metre. Random
numbers are generated on both sides with a quantum random number generator [10]. At Bob, clicks from
each of the photon counters are written together with the index of the pulse into a buffer and transferred
to the computer.
As a measure of security, the number of coincident clicks at both detectors is registered, which is important
to limit beamsplitting attacks (see below). Morover, the incoming power at Alice is continuously measured
with DA, in order to detect so called Trojan horse attacks.
III Key parameters in QKD
III.1 Key and error rates
The first important parameter is the raw key rate Rraw between Alice, the transmitter, and Bob, the
receiver:
Rraw = qνµtABtBηB (1)
where q depends on the implementation (1
2
for BB84 protocol, because half the time Alice and Bob bases
are not compatible), ν is the repetition frequency, µ is the average number of photons per pulse, tAB
is the transmission on the line Alice-Bob, tB is Bob’s internal transmission (tB ≈ 0.6) and ηB is Bob’s
detection efficiency (ηB ≈ 0.1).
After Rraw the second most important parameter is the quantum bit error rate (QBER) which consists
of four major contributions:
QBER =
false counts
total counts
= QBERopt +QBERdark +QBERafter +QBERstray (2)
QBERopt is simply the probability for a photon to hit the false detector. It can be measured with strong
pulses, by always applying the same phases and measuring the ratio of the count rates at the two detectors.
This is a measure of the quality of the optical alignment of the polarisation maintaining components and
the stability of the fibre link. In the ideal case, QBERopt is independent of the fibre length. QBERdark
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and QBERafter , the errors due to darkcounts and afterpulses, depend on the characteristics of the photon
counters[9]. QBERdark is the most important, it is the probability to have a darkcount per gate pdark,
divided by the probability to have a click pdet.
QBERdark ∼=
pdark
µtABtBηB
QBERdark increases with the distance and consequently limits the range of QKD. QBERafter is the
probability to have an after pulse pafter(t) summed over all gates between to detections:
QBERafter ∼=
n= 1
pdet∑
n=0
pafter
(
τ + n
1
ν
)
(3)
pafter, depending on the type of APD and on the temperature, decreases rapidly with time[9]. Neverthe-
less for high pulse rates (ν= 5 MHz) QBERafter can become significant. For instance, for pdet = 0.15%
(corresponding to about 7 dB loss with µ = 0.1) we measured a QBERafter of about 4%. By introducing
a dead time τ of 4 µs (during this time, following a detection, no gates are applied), QBERafter can be
reduced to 1.5%. The bit rate Rraw on the contrary, is only slightly reduced by a factor ητ :
ητ =
1
1 + νpdetτ
/ 1 (4)
In this example, ητ becomes 0.97 and 0.92, for 4 and 12 µs, respectively. In our prototype the deadtime
can be varied between 0 and 12 µs. The optimum deadtime varies as a function of distance, in our
measurements, however, we applied a constant deadtime of 4 µs. Finally, QBERstray, the errors induced
by stray-light, essentially Rayleigh back-scattered light, is a problem proper to the plug&play setup. It
can be almost completely removed with the help of Alice’s storage line and by sending trains of pulses
as mentioned above. However, we have to introduce another factor ηduty that reduces our bit rate. It
gives the duty cycle of the emitted pulse-trains and depends on the length of Alice’s delay line lD and
the length of the fibre link lAB:
ηduty =
lD
lAB + lD
(5)
Hence with our prototype we can expect a raw rate of Rraw of about:
Rraw = qνµtABtBηBηdutyητ ≈ 140kHz
(
µtAB
lD
lAB + lD
)
(6)
III.2 Error correction, privacy amplification and eavesdropping
The net secret key rate is further reduced during the error correction and privacy amplification process
by a factor of ηdist. We didn’t implement error correction and privacy amplification for our field tests,
but we would like to estimate roughly the net key rate that could be obtained with our system. In theory,
ηdist is simply given as the difference between the mutal information of Alice and Bob, IAB, and Alice
and Eve, IAE [3]:
ηdist = IAB(D)− IAE (7)
Due to the errors, IAB is smaller than 1. It is a function of the disturbance D, which is equal to the total
QBER:
IAB = 1+Dlog2D + (1−D)log2(1−D) (8)
In the following we estimate the information of Eve, IAE . In the line of Felix et.al. [11] we make the
following assumptions:
- The measured QBER should, within the statistical limits, be equal to what is estimated according eq.2.
If this is not the case, a real user won’t proceed and blindly apply privacy amplification, he will stop
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the key exchange and look for the problem. If the QBER is within these limits, we attribute to Eve the
QBERopt (.0.5%) plus the error (2σ) of the error estimation (. 0.5% for reasonably long keys), say 1%
in total. In the case of perfect equipment of the eavesdropper and true single photon source this error
corresponds to an information of 2ln21%
∼= 3%[13].
- In the case of faint laser pulses and especially in the presence of high fibre losses, Eve can take advantage
of multi-photon pulses and gain information while creating less or no errors[11]. In this case, it is
important to measure the length of the line and to register coincident clicks at Bob’s two detectors in
order to limit Eve’s possibilities. We assume that Eve possesses perfect technology, but cannot efficiently
measure the number of photons without disturbing them and cannot store them. Further, she disposes
of fibers with losses as low as 0.15dB/km. Under these assumptions one can calculate Eve’s information
per bit due to multi-photon pulses I2ν and obtains about 0.06, 0.14 and 0.40 for, 5, 10 and 20 dB loss,
respectively (for µ = 0.2 , 0.25dB/km fiber loss and 108 pulses sent). Consequently, we obtain
IAE ∼= 0.03 + I2ν (9)
With equations 7,8 and 9 we can caluclate a theoretical value of ηdist. In practice, ηdist will be smaller
due to the limitations of the used algorithm. Privacy amplification can be performed without additional
bit loss in contrary to error correction. For our estimation, we use the results of Tancewsky et al [12] for
I ′AB after error correction
I ′AB = 1 +Dlog2D −
7
2
D (10)
which is in fact considerably smaller than IAB . The information of Eve IAE is reduced by the same factor
I′AB
IAB
, too. Finally, we obtain the following estimation of Rnet:
Rnet = ηdistRraw
∼= (IAB − IAE)
I ′AB
IAB
Rraw (11)
≈
[
1 +Dlog2D −
7
2
D − (0.03 + I2ν)(1− (1 −D)log2(1 −D)−
7
2
D)
]
Rraw (12)
IV Field measurements
IV.1 Visibilities
In principle the prototype can be tested in the lab by performing key exchange with different fibre
losses and compare the measured QBER and bit rates with the estimated values according to the simple
formulas developed above. There are two motivations for field tests on installed cables. The first reason
is to check, if the auto-compensating setup is robust in many different situations. Several effects could
reduce the visibility of the interference. First, we have previously shown that Faraday rotation due to the
earth magnetic field cannot considerably decrease the visibility [14]. Second, the time delay between the
two pulses, travelling back and forth between Alice and Bob, could change due to a temperature drift.
Let’s assume that the temperature of the fiber increases with a rate θ
[
K
h
]
. The time delay ∆t between
the two pulses is 54ns. If θ is constant for the whole trip of the pulses, the second pulse will see a fibre
that is longer by ∆l :
∆l
l
= α∆T (13)
∆l = α2lAB∆T = α2lABθ∆t (14)
With α = 10−5
[
1
K
]
, lAB = 50km, θ = 10
[
K
h
]
we obtain 150pm ≪ λ. Hence this effect should be
negligable especially since installed fibres have slow temperature drifts. On the contrary, slow temperature
induced length drifts can be large enough that frequent readjustment of Bob’s delay become necessary. In
fact, we noticed that during the heating up of Alice’s box within the first hour of operation, the changes
in the delay line require a recalibration every 10 minutes or so. However, a bad synchronisation of the
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detection window does not affect QBERopt. Finally, mechanical stress could change the fiber length
and/or birefringence. If the birefringence changes rapidly, the pulses are no longer orthogonally polarized
at the input of Bob, despite the Faraday mirror. In this case the two pulses might suffer different losses at
Bob’s polarizing beamsplitter and the interference will no longer be perfect. Rapid changes in stress are
unlikely in installed cables, a couple of meters below the surface. For this reason we tested the prototype
also over an aerial cable. We had at our disposition two fibres of 4.35 km length, whereof 2.5 km in an
aerial cable. In order to amplify a hypothetical effect we put Alice and Bob side by side and passed twice
through the cable (config. A). In configuration B we inserted 1 spool of about 15 km at the other end of
the cable. Hence, the pulses made the following trip: Bob, the aerial cable, 15 km spool, the aerial cable,
15 km Alice with her 10 km storage line and back.
To measure the visibilities we send relatively strong pulses (a couple of photons per pulse) with always
the same, compatible phase values and look at the counts on the two detectors, Rright and Rwrong
(substracting the counts due to detector noise). We obtain then the fringe visibility according to the
standard definition:
V =
Rright −Rwrong
Rright +Rwrong
(15)
and the corresponding QBERopt:
QBERopt =
1− V
2
(16)
Table 1 summerises the result of visibility measurements over different cables. The indicated visibilities
are the mean values over all four possible compatible phase settings. There was no considerable decrease
of the visibility in any fibre, hence the auto-compensating interferometers worked well under all tested
conditions.
fibre length [km] loss [dB] Visibility [%]
Geneva-Nyon (under lake) 22.0 4.8 99.70 ± 0.03
Geneva-Nyon (terrestrial) 22.6 7.4 99.81 ± 0.03
Nyon-Lausanne (terrestrial) 37.8 10.6 99.63 ± 0.05
Geneva-Lausanne (under lake) A 67.1 14.4 99.62 ± 0.06
Geneva-Lausanne (under lake) B 67.1 14.3 99.66 ± 0.05
Ste Croix (aerial) A 8.7 3.8 99.70 ± 0.01
Ste Croix (aerial) B 23.7 7.2 99.71 ± 0.01
Table 1: Visibility measurements on different fibres
We tried to simulate an extremely unstable fibre link in the lab. For this purpose, we put a fibre-optical
polarisation scrambler (GAP-optique) at the output of Bob followed by 25 km of fibre. We measured the
visibility as function of the scrambler frequency. This frequency is defined as the number of complete
circles that the vector of polarisation would describe per second on the Poincare´ sphere, if the birefringence
changed uniformly. The visibility drops from 99.7% to 99.5% and 98% at frequencies of 40 Hz and 100
Hz respectively. This shows that the visibilities can decrease under rapid perturbations, however, it’s
unlikely to find such conditions using installed fibres.
IV.2 Key exchange
We performed key exchange over different installed cables, the longest connecting the cities of Lausanne
and Geneva (see Fig.3). We used always the same file of random numbers, in a way that Bob could make
the sifting and calculation of error rate without communication. We estimated the net key rate using
equation (11). Table 2 gives an overview of the exchanged keys with µ = 0.2.
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fibre length [km] Key [kbit] Rraw[kHz] QBER [%] Rnet[kHz]
Geneva-Nyon (under lake) 22.0 27.9 2.06 2.0±0.1 1.51
Geneva-Nyon (terrestrial) 22.6 27.5 2.02 2.1±0.1 1.39
Nyon-Lausanne (terrestrial) 37.8 25.1 0.50 3.9±0.2 0.26
Geneva-Lausanne (under lake) A 67.1 12.9 0.15 6.1±0.4 0.044
Geneva-Lausanne (under lake) B 67.1 12.9 0.16 5.6±0.3 0.051
Ste Croix (aerial) A 8.7 63.8 6.29 3.0±0.1 4.34
Ste Croix (aerial) B 23.7 117.6 2.32 3.0±0.1 1.57
Table 2: Overview of exchanged keys over different fibres (µ = 0.2).
We notice that secure key exchange is possible over more than 60 km with about 50 Hz of net key rate.
Conclusion
We presented a QKD prototype, which can be simply plugged into the wall, connected to a standard
optical fibre and a computer via the USB port. It allows key exchange over more than 60 km, with a net
key rate of about 60 bits per second. The system is commercially available [15].
V Figures
Figure 1: Picture of the p&p system
Figure 2: Schematic of the p&p prototype
Figure 3: Satellite view of Lake Geneva with the cities of Geneva, Nyon and Lausanne.
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